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RÉSUMÉ 
Traduire sans trahir, voilà la difficulté du traducteur comme 
celle du comparatiste. Comment garantir que les notions, une fois 
passées au filtre juridique, ne subissent pas une certaine altération, 
et ne perdent par là un peu d’elles-mêmes ? Cet article s’intéresse 
donc à un genre particulier de traduction où des concepts universels 
se voient convertis en notions juridiques. Dans le cas précis de la 
philanthropie, la traduction se révèle moins aisée en droit civil 
qu’en common law au point de s’interroger de la capacité de ce 
premier à accueillir les mécanismes philanthropiques. Il en ressort 
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alors que les traditions juridiques n’ont pas la même capacité à ac-
cueillir certaines notions et rendre au mieux les éléments qui les ca-
ractérisent.  
Keywords: charitable gifts, charitable-purpose trust, philanthropy, 
Québec charitable trust, foundation (France), charitable affectation  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on a specific case of translation where uni-
versal concepts travel across legal systems to be turned into legal 
concepts. The English language does not make any distinction be-
tween la traduction (meaning “to turn into another language”) and 
the idea of translation as a conceptual exchange.1 The word “trans-
lation” here refers to the fact that familiar ideas need to be decoded 
to be imported into a legal system. So, translation means conversion 
and requires a transcription. It is an annexation by the law as deter-
mined by each legal system’s tradition and foundations.2
Sometimes, the most familiar idea reveals itself to be very unfa-
miliar as soon as we look at it from another perspective. Despite the 
wish to preserve as much as possible the intrinsic idea of the initial 
concept, frictions inevitably appear because of the subsequent en-
counter between two different language approaches. Where one is 
unspecialized and commonly understood, the other one may be both 
specific and technical. As perfect correspondence in the conversion 
is pure fantasy, the jurist—even more so the comparatist—will need 
to work on finding equivalency to give the concept a legal meaning 
that is as close as possible to its original meaning.3 
                                                                                                             
    1. “The process of translating words or text from one language into an-
other.” Translation, OXFORD DICTIONARY, available at https://perma.cc/YZC8-
DPJZ. 
 2. Pierre Legrand, Issues in the Translatability of Law, in NATION, 
LANGUAGE AND THE ETHICS OF TRANSLATION 30, 31-32 (Sandra Berman & Mi-
chael Wood eds., Princeton University Press 2005). 
 3. LES INTRADUISIBLES EN DROIT CIVIL (Alexandra Popovici, Lionel D. 
Smith & Régine Tremblay eds., Éditions Thémis 2014). 




This is exactly what is happening in civil law systems with the 
specific example of philanthropy. Philanthropy is “the desire to pro-
mote the welfare of others, expressed especially by the generous do-
nation of money to good causes.”4 So, philanthropy is an individual 
act of generosity for public benefit. Its legal translation is a prag-
matic exercise5 seeking to determine the most efficient way to be 
generous to the public good.  
When we turn philanthropy into legally significant terms, phi-
lanthropy becomes a gratuitous transfer from a donor of all or part 
of his property for charitable purposes. Thus, the act by which a le-
gal subject dedicates property to charitable purposes is a private law 
operation. Even though philanthropy corresponds to a private initi-
ative with public impact and so is a kind of hybrid act, it always 
relies on a gratuitous transfer of ownership.  
However, the mechanism behind generosity constitutes the key 
to its legal transcription. The deep and noble feeling common to all 
philanthropists must be considered as a distinctive test from ordi-
nary gifts. Consequently, the operation to dedicate property to char-
itable purposes specifies the philanthropic act. A charitable affecta-
tion6 emerges, which means that property is affected to a precise 
charitable purpose.  
As it raises the ideas of “affectation”7 and transfer of ownership, 
charitable affectation instantly challenges patrimony theory and 
property law. Further, it leads us to re-think them in an altruistic 
context, which may have disruptive effects with respect to the basics 
of civil law. 
                                                                                                             
 4. Philanthropy, OXFORD DICTIONARY, available at https://perma.cc/Z8TK 
-H5LU.  
 5. Alexandra Popovici, La fiducie québécoise, re-belle infidèle, in LES 
INTRADUISIBLES EN DROIT CIVIL, supra note 3, at 139-141.  
 6. This translation for “affectation d’intérêt général” is an expression devel-
oped in my doctoral work.  
 7. SERGE GUINCHARD, L'AFFECTATION DES BIENS EN DROIT PRIVÉ FRANÇAIS 
15 (Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 1976); Sylvio Normand, L’af-
fectation en droit des biens au Québec, 48 REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS 599, 602-
603, available at https://perma.cc/7TZM-T4LK (work presented at the Colloque 
du Centre Paul-André Crépeau de McGill portant réflexions sur “l’affectation”). 




The private law of Louisiana, France and Québec8 reveal three 
different scenarios for the translation of philanthropy. In Louisiana, 
the question has been taken up in the Trust Code,9 and purposely 
outside of the Civil Code.10 In France, there is no specific mention 
of charitable affectation in the Civil Code. The rules of ordinary gifts 
and obligations still apply. Nevertheless their charitable form is reg-
ulated by specific provisions of public law.11 Accordingly, charita-
ble affectation is mostly outside the Civil Code there as well. Only 
the Québec Civil Code offers a few specific provisions in the title 
“Certain Patrimonies by Appropriation.”12 However, it seems that 
donors in Québec also prefer the non-profit corporation vehicle sub-
ject to specific provisions of law, rather than the general civilian 
trust.13  
                                                                                                             
 8. Edward F. Martin, Lousiana’s Law of Trusts 25 Years After Adoption of 
the Trust Code, 50 LA. L. REV. 501 (1990), available at https://perma.cc/NVA2-
Q4FF; Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Louisiana Trusts: The experience of Civil Law 
Jurisdiction with the Trust, 42 LA. L. REV. 1721, 1726-28 (1982), available at 
https://perma.cc/7KPJ-XNE7; LOUIS BAUDOUIN, LE DROIT CIVIL DE LA 
PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC : MODÈLE VIVANT DE DROIT COMPARÉ 102-14, 375 et seq. 
(Wilson et Lafleur 1953). 
 9. See charitable trusts in Louisiana’s “Trust Code,” LA REV. STAT. § 9:2271 
et seq., available at https://perma.cc/G9BJ-DDST. 
 10. Michael McAuley, Truth and reconciliation: Notions of property in Lou-
isiana’s Civil and Trust Codes, in RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL 
LAW 119, 123-24, (Lionel D. Smith ed., Cambridge University Press 2012): 
On the private law topic of property, the contemporary arrangement of 
Louisiana law is undeniably referential to the civil law tradition . . . with 
the singular exception of the law of trusts. Trust (bodies trust), as con-
tainers (funds, universalities, patrimonies) of things to which persons are 
entitled and over which powers are exercised in the discharge of duties, 
are not contemplated in this arrangement . . . . [O]wnership in the Civil 
Code and fiduciary administration in the Trust Code are assigned sepa-
rate, distinct spheres of operation. 
See also Martin, supra note 8. 
 11. RAYMOND SALEILLES, DE LA PERSONNALITÉ JURIDIQUE, HISTOIRE ET 
THÉORIES, VINGT-CINQ LEÇONS D’INTRODUCTION À UN COURS DE DROIT CIVIL 
COMPARÉ SUR LES PERSONNES JURIDIQUES 259 et seq. (La Mémoire du Droit 
2003).  
 12. Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.) Title 6 of Book 4. See also John E.C. 
Brierley, De certains patrimoines d’affectation, in BARREAU DE QUÉBEC ET 
CHAMBRE DES NOTAIRES DU QUÉBEC, 1 LA RÉFORME DU CODE CIVIL 375 et seq. 
(Presses de l’Université de Laval 1993). 
 13. Most charities in Québec are registered as non-profit corporations. André 
J. Barette, Service de la formation continue du Barreau du Québec, La fiducie 




Although charitable affectation is not thought of in the same way 
in these three legal systems, they all share the same difficulty of 
finding a place for charitable contributions in private law. Conse-
quently, is private law an anti-charitable law? 
In the light of social needs, the absence of charitable purposes in 
civil codes is questionable with respect to practical purposes and 
also with the need to establish a clear correspondence between civil 
law concepts and the simple idea of generosity toward society. By 
disregarding philanthropy as a private law concern, it seems that 
civil codes present just one kind of generosity and also impose a 
unique way to use property. In this regard, civil codes risk no longer 
being responsive to the needs of society.14 
Therefore, what exactly does it mean to realize an “affectation 
d’intérêt général”? Can private law welcome this concept in its 
field? These are the questions I want to investigate by looking at the 
French and Québec examples. As such, I will question how charita-
ble contribution is compatible with (II) the civil law tradition and 
(III) its mechanisms. 
II. ARE CIVIL LAW PRINCIPLES HOSTILE TO CHARITABLE 
AFFECTATION? 
The legal filter operates against the translation of philanthropy 
because the civil law tradition does not allow translating without in-
terpreting in this particular case. Misconception (A) and adaptations 
(B) could not have been prevented. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
d’utilité sociale : réflexions sur un thème méconnu, in FIDUCIES PERSONNELLES 
ET SUCCESSIONS (Yvon Blais 2007).  
 14. “Il [le Législateur] ne doit point perdre de vue que les lois sont faites pour 
les hommes, et non les hommes pour les lois ; qu’elles doivent être adaptées au 
caractère, aux habitudes, à la situation du peuple pour lequel elles sont faites…” 
Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis, Discours préliminaire au Premier Projet de Code 
civil, in VOIX DE LA CITÉ 16 (Confluences 1999).  




A. Misconception in the Translation 
In charitable contributions, donors do not transfer property to the 
recipient for his own interest, but for the charitable cause that the 
recipient embodies. The charitable gift is made out of a force of ac-
tion for charitable purposes.15 Of course, the donor desires that peo-
ple will benefit from his gift, but without a precise idea of who will 
actually benefit therefrom. The consideration of beneficiaries as par-
ticular persons is not relevant to donors; only the charitable cause is.  
Thus, charitable contributions cannot be fully assimilated to or-
dinary gifts because they are not made intuitus personæ [in consid-
eration of the person], but “intuitus causæ.” This is why this partic-
ular gift should be qualified as an objective gift, a gift in which the 
specific end being pursued by the donor is the principal considera-
tion of the gratuitous transfer.  
In civil law thinking, this scheme is somewhat surprising, as all 
subjective rights should imply a personal bond or a relationship be-
tween the creditor and the debtor of the obligation, even if the object 
of the right is another’s good. This personal character comes from 
the fact that all subjective rights are defined as prerogatives that the 
law attributes to a person in his or her interest. In the case of chari-
table affectation, the charitable cause is the preeminent element of 
the transfer, which is no longer motivated by any personal interest. 
So, as the relationship looks more non-personal, it seems impossible 
“de construire le rapport d’affectation comme un droit réel” [“to 
construe the relationship of affectation as a real right”].16 
The only way to solve this paradox is to bring the charitable gift 
back into a relationship between two legal persons and therefore pre-
                                                                                                             
 15. Planiol used this expression of “puissance d’action” [force of action], see 
Christophe Vernières, Les libéralités à trois personnes 211 (Apr. 4, 2012) (unpu-
blished Ph.D. dissertation, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas) (on file with au-
thor).  
 16. JEAN CARBONNIER, 3 DROIT CIVIL : LES BIENS : MONNAIE, IMMEUBLES, 
MEUBLES 14 (19th ed., Presses Universitaires de France 2000).  




tend that the recipient is a donee. Still, the legal fiction that the re-
cipient is a donee is a plain misconception of what charitable affec-
tation is. In any translation exercise, concepts should be converted 
with only alteration, not denaturation.  
This misconception may be reduced if the recipient effectively 
dedicates the property to the charitable purpose. Consequently, all 
charitable gifts should be assumed as a triptych, where each panel is 
occupied by the donor, the recipient or an administrator,17 and the 
beneficiaries. The recipient becomes the central and balancing panel 
of the picture. He is the one to fulfill the charitable purpose while 
his hands are tied both by the donor’s will and, most of all, by the 
beneficiaries’ interest preservation. Only such a triptych structure 
will save charitable affectation from inconsistency, which is why 
finding an appropriate vehicle becomes crucial. 
B. Adaptations to the Translation 
By separating the administration from the benefit of the title, the 
comparatist’s first thought goes to the common law trust. The com-
mon law early on assimilated philanthropy in the charitable-purpose 
trust.18 The trust, as a flexible device for holding property, effi-
                                                                                                             
 17. According to the GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE 
(Alain Levasseur & Marie-Eugénie Laporte-Legeais trans., LexisNexis 2014), the 
administrator is “[h]e who is charged with the administration of a thing or of an 
aggregate of things that belong to another or to the administrator and some third 
person in indivision.” The French understanding of “administrateur,” however, is 
broader than its understanding in Québec. According to the well-established thesis 
of Professor Madeleine Cantyn Cumin, the administrator is the “[p]erson exercis-
ing powers over property or a patrimony that is not his or her own,” PAUL-ANDRÉ 
CRÉPEAU CENTRE FOR PRIVATE AND COMPARATIVE LAW, PRIVATE LAW 
DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL LEXICONS – PROPERTY (France Allard et al. eds., 
Yvon Blais 2012) [hereinafter PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY – PROPERTY]. This 
means that in Québec the administrator does not hold any right of ownership over 
property but he is only exercising power. This constitutes a notable point of di-
vergence between the two civil law systems.  
 18. Charitable Uses Act 1601, 43 Eliz I, c. 4, available at https://perma.cc 
/4S5V-7SAH. The origins of the trust are deeply rooted in the practice of Christian 
charity, see H. Patrick Glenn, The Historical Origins of the Trust, in AEQUITAS 




ciently embodies philanthropy. According to the fiduciary relation-
ship, the trustee will have substantial control over the trust property. 
He is also bound to act entirely in the interests of beneficiaries with 
honesty, candor, and loyalty.19 The selflessness that is subsumed 
within the fiduciary obligation introduces an altruistic way of hold-
ing property. The charitable trust corresponds clearly with the es-
sence of the charitable contribution. It concretizes the desired trip-
tych. 
The legal translation of trust in civil law systems has been the 
subject of much debate. Beyond the split in the title of ownership, 
the other strong resistance resides in the theory of patrimony. Ac-
cording to the civil law tradition, no one can divide their patrimony 
into different sub-universalities to achieve specific purposes.20 The 
only way to achieve charitable affectation, at first, was to form a 
legal person to carry out the charitable purpose.  
As a result, French law introduced the foundation.21 The foun-
dation is a two-step operation: from an inter vivos or testamentary 
gift, an organization with legal personality will be formed on the 
condition that the Ministry of internal affairs approves its charitable 
rationale.22 We must note that the foundation is positioned between 
private law and public law, making the charitable affectation more 
                                                                                                             
AND EQUITY: EQUITY IN CIVIL LAW AND MIXED JURISDICTIONS 749 (Alfredo 
Mordechai Rabello ed., Hammacabi Press 1997).  
 19. ALBERT H. OOSTERHOFF ET AL., OOSTERHOFF ON TRUSTS: TEXT, 
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 18 (Carswell 2009). 
 20. This refers to Aubry and Rau’s essential theory of patrimony. CHARLES 
AUBRY ET AL., 9 COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS D’APRÈS LA MÉTHODE DE 
ZACHARIÆ paras. 573-74 (5th ed., Étienne Bartin ed., Marchal et Billard 1917), 
available at https://perma.cc/5YJQ-V22J. Even though this theory knows many 
exceptions today, it still remains the fundamental theory that delineates the con-
cepts of patrimony and legal personality in civil law. For a brief overview of this 
point, see HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., 1 LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL, INTRODUCTION À 
L'ÉTUDE DU DROIT 279 et seq. (Montchrestien 1970); Yves Lequette, Prolégo-
mènes, 77 REVUE LAMY DROIT CIVIL 63 (2010). See also Philippe Dupichot, Le 
fabuleux destin de la théorie de l’unicité du patrimoine, 2 REVUE DE DROIT HENRI 
CAPITANT (2011), available at https://perma.cc/9MV8-64KX. 
 21. SALEILLES, supra note 11, at 269.  
 22. Art. 18, Loi n° 87-571 du 23 juillet 1987 relative au développement du 
mécénat, available at https://perma.cc/6DGS-TBGM. 




than ever a hybrid act. The initiative may belong to an individual, 
but the creation, administration, and even the entire regime of the 
foundation are in the hands of specific provisions of public law. In 
France, the dedication of property to a charitable purpose results in 
an original constellation of private and public law.  
However, charitable affectation as a foundation is not particu-
larly satisfactory. First, legal personality rides roughshod over the 
true objective nature of the act whereby property is devoted to char-
itable purposes. It turns the objective gift into a common subjective 
gift. Second, individual initiative is diluted by the administrative re-
gime of foundations. This is a total eclipse of the charitable contri-
bution’s private origin.  
The Québec Civil Code certainly offers the most faithful tran-
scription of philanthropy in law. In emancipating itself from the ci-
vilian tradition of ownership and patrimony, it enacted a civilian 
trust by way of patrimony by appropriation.23 Some argued that the 
Québec trust should have been another legal person24 but, as argued, 
this alternative would have denatured its common law origin and the 
desire to introduce a flexible device.  
This calls for three remarks. First, the Québec charitable trust 
essentially constitutes a private law matter, with most provisions be-
ing found in the Civil Code.25 Its constituting act does not imply any 
formalities that would introduce any procedures that lie within the 
                                                                                                             
 23. The Québec trust is “[p]atrimony by appropriation created for the benefit 
of a person or for the fulfillment of a purpose authorized by law,” and “patrimony 
by appropriation” is “[p]atrimony distinct from that of a person and assigned to a 
particular purpose recognized by law.” Trust, PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY – 
PROPERTY, supra note 17. 
 24. Yves Caron, The Trust in Quebec, 25 MCGILL L.J. 421 (1980), available 
at https://perma.cc/H58R-WUL6. For a critical analysis of the assimilation of the 
trust to a legal person, see Lionel Smith, Trust and Patrimony, 38 REVUE 
GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 379 (2008), available at https://perma.cc/QK4K-V4YN.  
 25. C.C.Q. art. 1256. First, contrary to the foundation as a legal person, no 
letters patent are required to establish a foundation-trust. Second, this relative lack 
of regulation stands in opposition to French law, in that all charitable devices are 
in between private and public law. The French State maintains a strong control 
over the constitution and the administration of all charitable contributions and ac-
tivities.  




field of public law.26 In France, because the State is said to have a 
monopoly on the definition and achievement of public interest, all 
charitable activities fall in the scope of public law.27 Contrary to 
Québec’s regime, no charitable activity can fully be a private initia-
tive in France. Beyond political rationales, charitable purposes ap-
peared inconsistent with the object of private law. Despite these dif-
ficulties, charitable purposes finally found a way to exist in private 
law thanks to the Québec trust.28 The symbolism is as important as 
the technical aspects.29 There is no public law intrusion. The Québec 
charitable trust persists in being a private initiative ruled by private 
law, contrary to the French foundation, which externalizes charita-
ble contributions from private law.  
Second, the Québec trust is able to meet the needs of a wide va-
riety of charitable contributions, from the outright gift to the creation 
                                                                                                             
 26. In France, the creation of a foundation requires the obtaining of the “re-
connaissance d’utilité publique” [recognition that it promotes the public good], 
which is evaluated and given by the State. A foundation cannot be granted legal 
personality without it. The procedure of “reconnaissance d’utilité publique” is 
within the competences of both the Ministère de l’Intérieur [Ministry of the Inte-
rior] and the Conseil d’État [Council of State]. See Olivier Binder, La Fondation 
Reconnue d’Utilité Publique, in GUIDE JURIDIQUE ET FISCAL DU MÉCÉNAT ET DES 
FONDATIONS À L'USAGE DES ENTERPRISES ET DES ENTREPRENEURS 130 (4th ed., 
Admical 2008); Gwenaëlle Dufour, Legs et contrôle adminsitratif, in Le guide 
des associations & fondations : Legs et donations 20 (Philippe Carillon ed., 
LexisNexis 2011). 
 27. CONSEIL D'ÉTAT, RÉFLEXIONS SUR L'INTÉRÊT GÉNÉRAL – RAPPORT 
PUBLIC 1999 (1999), available at https://perma.cc/9YBL-J646 (Last visited: 
March 22, 2014); Laurence Boy, L’intérêt collectif en droit français – Réflexions 
sur la collectivisation du droit (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Université 
de Nice) (on file with author); LA JUNIORCONSULTING – SCIENCESPO POUR 
L'INSTITUT PASTEUR, ÉTUDE SUR LA RÉNOVATION DE L'INTÉRÊT GÉNÉRAL EN 
FRANCE, POUR UNE DÉFINITION ÉVOLUTIVE ET CO-CONSTRUITE DE L'INTÉRÊT 
GÉNÉRAL, 78 (Philippe-Henri Dutheil & Antoine Vaccaro eds., 2013), available at 
https://perma.cc/3BCR-MH7K; Colas Amblard, Intérêt général, utilité publique 
ou utilité sociale : Quel mode de reconnaissance pour le secteur associatif ?, 315 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE L’ÉCONOMIE SOCIALE 21 (2010), available at 
https://perma.cc/KS9V-W8R6. 
 28. Martin Boodman demonstrates how the Québec trust is the most adpated 
institution to operate charitable contribution. Martin Boodman, Les libéralités à 
des fins charitables au Québec et en France 146 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Université Paris II Panthéon Arras) (on file with author).  
 29. Roderick A. Macdonald, Reconceiving the Symbols of Property: Univer-
salities, Interests and Other Heresies, 39 MCGILL L.J. 761 (1994), available at 
https://perma.cc/AZ29-C9A7. 




of a charitable organization. For example, French law requires gifts 
with charges (or restricted gifts) to operate every charitable contri-
bution. The charitable purpose is covered by the restriction on the 
gift, and this is the only way to operate charitable gifts.30 Further, 
the charitable contribution is conceptualized through principles of 
the law of obligations, which means that the charitable contribution 
represents a personal obligation between the donor and the recipient. 
This personal obligation is an accessory one,31 and the mechanism 
of stipulation for another32 applies. Still, how could this work effi-
ciently when the beneficiary is a class of undetermined people?33 
                                                                                                             
 30. See “libéralités sub modo” in MARCEL PLANIOL, GEORGES RIPERT & 
JEAN BOULANGER, 3 TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL : RÉGIMES 
MATRIMONIAUX, SUCCESSIONS, LIBÉRALITÉS paras. 3661 et seq., 3715 (4th ed., Li-
brairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 1950); FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., 
DROIT CIVIL: LES SUCCESSIONS, LES LIBÉRALITÉS para. 348 et seq. (4th ed., Dalloz 
2013). See also René Demogue, La fiducie en droit moderne: rapports prépara-
toires et discussion in 5 TRAVAUX DE LA SEMAINE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT (Li-
brairie du recueil Sirey 1937). The French solution remains the right of ownership 
restricted by a specific affectation.  
 31. Vernières, supra note 15, at 72.  
 32. C. civ. art. 1205. Generally, all references to the Code Civil de France in 
French are available at https://perma.cc/RZ9S-EWKJ. According to the Diction-
ary of the Civil Code, CORNU, supra note 17, stipulation for another corresponds 
to the: 
agreement whereby one party (the stipulator) causes another (the prom-
isor) to promise to perform an obligation in favor of a third party (the 
beneficiary); complex juridical device in which the stipulation may be 
revoked by the stipulator until such time as the beneficiary has not ac-
cepted it, but according to which the acceptance by the beneficiary prior 
to the revocation of the stipulation renders the latter irrevocable and, fur-
thermore, it vests in the third party a direct right of action against the 
promisor for the performance of his commitment. 
 33. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 571, para. 511, 
588, 534. (11th ed., Dalloz 2013) (Il y a stipulation pour autrui lorsque, dans un 
contrat, une des parties, appelée le stipulant, obtient de l’autre, appelée le promet-
tant, l’engagement qu’elle donnera ou fera quelque chose au profit d’un tiers 
étranger, le bénéficiaire, qui devient ainsi créancier sans avoir été partie au con-
trat. ”) ; (“ On peut aujourd’hui poser en principe qu’une stipulation au profit de 
personnes indéterminées est valable, à condition que le bénéficiaire, indéterminé 
au moment de la stipulation, soit déterminable lorsqu’elle doit recevoir effet. Dans 
cette perspective, il faut, mais il suffit, que le contrat conclu entre le stipulant et 
le promettant comporte des éléments d’une détermination ultérieure. ”).  
See also Henri Souleau, L’Acte de fondations en droit français 167 et seq. (1969) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with author).  




The Québec trust made gifts with charges useless.34 It intro-
duced another dimension to giving35 by offering a corpus of civil 
law rules36 not only to allocate but also to manage the given property 
for the achievement of a specific charitable purpose. Thanks to the 
Québec trust, the charitable contribution moves from the subjective 
right stage to the institution stage.37 
Finally, based on the objective theory of patrimony,38 the Qué-
bec trust concretized a true patrimony by appropriation, charitable 
or not, wherein the trust assets constitute an “autonomous and dis-
tinct”39 legal universality from the patrimonies of the settlor and 
trustee. Its purpose gives rise to its existence.40 No actual beneficiar-
ies necessarily seem needed,41 contrary to the common law trust. 
This generates a major paradigm shift in civil law as the Québec 
                                                                                                             
 34. The trust is much more efficient to determine the way of using property. 
So, except in the case of family matters, restricted charitable gifts disappeared in 
favor of the charitable trust. See John E.C. Brierley, The Gratuitous Trust: A New 
Liberality in Quebec Law, in MÉLANGES À PAUL-ANDRÉ CRÉPEAU 119 (Yvon 
Blais 1997). 
 35. Id.  
 36. C.C.Q art. 1260 et seq. 
 37. Macdonald, supra note 29, at para. 20, 
No longer simply a modality of gifts and wills, the device has achieved 
a separate existence as a legal institution: it may be created by onerous 
as well as gratuitous act; it may be created for public or private purposes; 
it may be created for charitable or for business purposes. The trust under 
the Civil Code of Québec must be detached from its historical origins as 
a device like the substitution, and must be reconceived as a facilitative 
institution, whose finalities are no longer substantive and external to it 
(e.g. the giving of a liberality) but procedural and internal (e.g. the man-
agement of property for the benefit of another person or for the achieve-
ment of an authorized purpose, by an independent third person, who act-
ing as an administrator, manages the trust corpus or patrimony as a ju-
ridical universality).  
 38. For a summary of this particular point, see Frédéric Zenati-Castaing, L’af-
fectation québécoise, un malentendu porteur d’avenir, 48 REVUE JURIDIQUE 
THÉMIS 623, 628-631 (2014), available at https://perma.cc/N9VA-9CHK (work 
presented at the Colloque du Centre Paul-André Crépeau de McGill portant ré-
flexions sur “ l’affectation ”).  
 39. C.C.Q. art. 1261. 
 40. On the termination of a Québec trust, see C.C.Q. art. 1296. 
 41. C.C.Q. art. 1277. On this particular point, the Québec trust is very close 
to the droit sans sujet (“right without a subject”) enunciated by the German author 
Alois von Brinz. See SALEILLES, supra note 11, at 476.  




civil law defines a new way to hold property42 outside real rights.43 
Beyond the recognition of the patrimony by appropriation, this tends 
to weaken the domination of absolute ownership.  
This solution at the same time revives and compromises Québec 
civil law. It revives Québec civil law because it creates a civilian 
trust and so increases the ways to allocate property. On the other 
hand, it also compromises Québec civil law because lawmakers did 
not define the precise nature of the trustee’s power44 or the benefi-
ciaries’ interest.45 Since this casts a shadow over practice in this area 
of law, the Québec trust is relatively unused by those with philan-
thropic ambitions. Paradoxically, the presumed most adapted device 
to operate charitable contribution (under a technical perspective) is 
almost ignored by the bar. An historical and cultural overview 
would probably have explanatory power. Still, a main question 
arises: are private law mechanisms perhaps just unsuited to charita-
ble affectation? 
 
III. ARE PRIVATE LAW MECHANISMS UNSUITED TO CHARITABLE 
AFFECTATION? 
All charitable affectation requires (A) the trustee’s selflessness 
and (B) an external oversight. Both requirements ensure the charita-





                                                                                                             
 42. C.C.Q. art. 2.  
 43. Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, Le pouvoir juridique, 52 MCGILL L.J. 215 
(2007), available at https://perma.cc/6SEP-M4AE. 
 44. “Il [le fiduciaire] exerce une fonction qui lui accorde des pouvoirs et des 
devoirs,” Alexandra Popovici, Le patrimoine d’affectation : Nature, culture, rup-
ture 45 et seq., 47 (2012) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation, Université Laval) (on 
file with author), available at https://perma.cc/D25S-5RF9.  
 45. C.C.Q. arts. 1284, 1290-91. On the nature of the beneficiary’s interest, 
see Popovici, supra note 44, at 51-55.  




A. The Selflessness Requirement 
The recipient’s selflessness is required because no objective gift 
can be made if the trustee lacks altruism. Obviously, the trustee can-
not hold property as an ordinary owner. Charitable contributions 
necessarily call for a reconsideration of absolute ownership. 
At issue is not so much how ownership could be shared between 
the recipient and the actual beneficiaries, but rather the acceptance 
of a non-individualistic and limited ownership. Ownership must be 
selflessly and purposely executed in order to be consistent with the 
intrinsic nature of philanthropy. 
Thinking of civilian ownership in relative terms has led exactly 
to the adoption of the patrimony of appropriation in the Civil Code 
of Québec instead of a sui generis ownership46 The prevailing doc-
trine claimed that the intrinsic nature of ownership in the civil law 
is to be self-oriented.47 Thus, in no case could the ownership be pur-
posely restricted in favor of someone else. By adopting the patri-
mony by appropriation, Québec lawmakers introduced a parallel 
way to hold property.48 The concept of power49 is in a separate cat-
egory of prerogatives, one distinct from those of subjective rights.50 
Power is granted to the administrator to achieve a purpose and is 
limited by constraints.51  
                                                                                                             
 46. This has been the case in Québec civil law since the decision of the Su-
preme Court of Canada in Royal Trust Co v. Tucker, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 250 at 272-
73, available at https://perma.cc/5CP8-V4Y4, in which it was held that the trustee 
had “a sui generis property right, which the legislator implicitly but necessarily 
intended to create when he introduced the trust into the civil law.” 
 47. Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, La propriété fiduciaire : mythe ou réalité ?, 
15 REVUE DE DROIT DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE 7 (1984). 
 48. LOUIS JOSSERAND, DE L'ESPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVITÉ : 
THÉORIE DITE DE L'ABUS DES DROITS para. 420 (Dalloz 1927); PIERRE LEPAULLE, 
TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES TRUSTS EN DROIT INTERNE, EN DROIT FISCAL 
ET EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 50 (Rousseau & Cie 1932). 
 49. EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LE POUVOIR EN DROIT PRIVÉ (Economica 1985); 
Camyn, supra note 43. 
 50. C.C.Q. art. 2. See also Macdonald, supra note 29, at 776 et seq.  
 51. “[L]e fiduciaire sera toujours soumis aux obligations imposées par le lé-
gislateur d’agir avec prudence et diligence, honnêteté et loyauté dans le meilleur 
intérêt de la fin poursuivie,” Popovici, supra note 44, at 46. “La codification des 
règles de l’administration du bien d’autrui met en lumière la singularité des 




The French doctrine also moderated ownership, but its solution 
remains doctrinal, not formal. Doctrinal commentaries outlined that 
all ownership may be subject to conditions and restrictions without 
denaturing the fundamental nature of ownership.52 Alongside inal-
ienable ownership and common tenancy, we could easily admit a 
purposive ownership. Just like other modes of property rights, own-
ership may be modulated without being denatured.53 Alongside in-
dividualistic ownership, the idea of a socially oriented ownership54 
emerges again, but outside the disposition of the Civil Code.55  
As such, Québec law formalized two different and separate ways 
to hold property with the aim of preserving absolute ownership. The 
French doctrine splits ownership into two parts according to the pur-
pose for which the right is performed. Both solutions generate a tre-
mendous shift in civil law. They both demonstrate how ownership 
is limited by the individualism in which it has been inscribed. It also 
reveals how deep the disharmony between charitable generosity and 
the civil law tradition runs. The concretization of charitable giving 
could not be done without rethinking the place of ownership and real 
rights in civil law principles. 
B. The External Oversight Requirement 
Now, I turn to the last part of my article, which focuses on the 
beneficiaries’ position. Beneficiaries have a legal interest in the 
                                                                                                             
normes qui régissent cette activité. On constate, en effet, que d’importantes con-
traintes lient tout administrateur alors que ces contraintes sont absentes dans 
l’exercice d’un droit par son titulaire,” Cumyn, supra note 43, at 222.  
 52. Vernières, supra note 15, at 160-83. 
 53. Sylvio Normand, La notion de modalité de la propriété, in MÉLANGES 
OFFERTS AU PROFESSEUR FRANÇOIS FRÉNETTE : ÉTUDES PORTANT SUR LE DROIT 
PATRIMONIAL 251 (Presses Université Laval 2006); Yaëll Emerich, La fiducie ci-
viliste : modalité de la propriété ou intermède à la propriété ?, 58 MCGILL L.J. 
827 (2012), available at https://perma.cc/HQ6Y-UH45.  
 54. LÉON DUGUIT, AUTOUR DE LA FONCTION SOCIALE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ (Dal-
loz 1901); Simon Deploige, La théorie thomiste de la propriété (suite et fin), 2 
REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE 286 (1895), available at https://perma.cc/487R-KQG4.  
 55. C. civ. art. 544 still defines ownership as “the right to enjoy and dispose 
of objects in the most complete manner, provided they are not used in a way pro-
hibited by statutes or regulations.”  




property’s administration. While beneficiaries have no rights to the 
charitably affected property, they have a legal interest in the power 
that the administrator holds over the object.56  
This is precisely where civil law systems find it difficult to trans-
late the charitable affectation. All legal relationships are erected to 
satisfy personal interests. For this reason, the consideration of an-
other, in private relationships, sounds paradoxical. Can the benefi-
ciaries effectively require compliance with the gift impersonally 
made for them?  
In France, two effective devices exist.57 The first one allows do-
nors to demand that the administrator be forced to perform 
charges.58 The second one allows donors and their heirs to demand 
revocation for non-performance of charges.59 Nevertheless, in both 
cases, there is no guarantee that the donors or their heirs are acting 
in the beneficiaries’ interest instead of their own private interests.60 
The Québec Civil Code stipulates that any “interested” person may 
                                                                                                             
 56. According to Lionel Smith, “[t]he trust beneficiary’s rights are rights in 
the rights that the trustee holds in the object.” Smith, supra note 24, at 392 (em-
phasis in original). 
 57. Still, as I have already mentioned, the mechanism of stipulation for an-
other is ineffective as long as the beneficiary of the stipulation remains indeter-
minate, the situation which typifies beneficiaries in most charitable contributions. 
 58. The rule of C. civ. art. 1221 applies only to a donation with charge as it 
constitutes a synallagmatic (or bilateral) contract. C. civ. art. 1184 para. 2 also 
references specific performance of the contract. See Rafael Ibarra Garza, Protect-
ing the Trust fund in French and English Law, 20 TRUST & TRUSTEES 421 (2014):  
Specific performance of the breached contract has an effect to enforce 
the contract as the parties intended, therefore this remedy is the most 
respectful to the wishes of the parties to the breached contract; reason 
why specific enforcement is considered a right of the innocent party. So 
if he demands specific performance and this is still possible, the judge 
will have no discretion and will have to order specific performance of 
the contract. 
 59. C. civ. art. 954 provides as follows: “Dans le cas de la révocation pour 
cause d’inexécution des conditions, les biens rentreront dans les mains du dona-
teur, libres de toutes charges et hypothèques du chef du donataire; et le donateur 
aura, contre les tiers détenteurs des immeubles donnés, tous les droits qu’il aurait 
contre le donataire lui-même.” See also C. civ. art. 956, which provides that “[l]a 
révocation pour cause d’inexécution des conditions, ou pour cause d’ingratitude, 
n’aura jamais lieu de plein droit.”  
 60. See the demonstration in Souleau, supra note 33, at para. 97 et seq.  




claim for the execution of the trust.61 There are many uncertainties 
around this provision. Can each beneficiary equally and indiffer-
ently bring the matter before the courts? Does any beneficiary have 
sufficient legal interest to engage his or her own assets in that case? 
No subjective right seems adapted to this situation because all ben-
eficiaries share a mutual concern in the trust execution. They should 
be able collectively to protect their unique interest against any trus-
tee’s mismanagement. 
Common law systems developed solutions that civil law systems 
should more readily consider.62 These systems imagined a public 
institution to protect all beneficiaries’ interest.63 In many common 
law systems, the attorney general is in charge of representing and 
preserving the public good at law, while the charitable commission, 
whose role is much more specific, has control over the governance 
of charities and prevents the disrespect of beneficiaries’ interests. 
Such institutions are suggested in the Québec Civil Code, but were 
never established.64  
Of course, the hybrid nature of charitable affectations, as well as 
pragmatic concerns, seem necessarily to lead to the outsourcing of 
oversight from private law. Does this justify, however, private law’s 
deficiency with respect to the adequate protection of beneficiaries’ 
interests? One thing is for sure: developing external oversight would 
better achieve the conversion of philanthropy into law and offer a 
steady path to enshrining the charitable-giving triptych. 
 
                                                                                                             
 61. C.C.Q. art. 1290.  
 62. The supervision from an external person or body designated by the law is 
mentioned at C.C.Q. art. 1288. This kind of supervision has never been in the case 
with a social trust. The composition of a French foundation’s board of directors 
may include a member of the Government. The board’s main role, however, is 
more to control the use of funds rather than to promote the public good as an 
Attorney General in many common law systems would do. 
 63. Kathryn Chan, The Role of the Attorney General in Charity in Canada 
and in England and in Wales, 89 CANADIAN BAR REVIEW 373 (2010). 
 64. C.C.Q. art. 1288. 





Le Code civil n’est pas une œuvre anti-affectation d’intérêt gé-
néral dès lors que l’on admet une modération de ses principes fon-
damentaux. Notons que ces principes sont le fruit d’une doctrine 
circonstanciée et que rien aujourd’hui n’en impose une telle lecture 
hormis notre attachement à la tradition.  
La traduction juridique des concepts universels s’avère parfois 
une tâche ardue et incertaine pour le juriste qui doit trancher entre 
la préservation originelle et la trahison forcée. Dans le cas présenté, 
la ligne de conduite ne semble pas encore être parfaitement dessi-
née, si bien qu’en attendant, l’affectation d’intérêt général demeure 
en quelque sorte… lost in translation en droit civil. 
 
